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My subject includes a "work in progress" of mine, which is
designed to step up a level of generality and look at how these issues
with which we have struggled, here in some detail, fit into a broader
perspective. We have discussed competition policy, telecommunica-
tions, and certain other aspects of those; however, there are many sub-
jects that one could think of along the same lines. There are, of
course, the very pregnant areas of financial services, and some of the
difficulties that have been going on this year, and certain peculiar fea-
tures of them. In the financial services area, we have to worry much
more about problems of fiduciary relationships, prudential protections
of consumers, fraud-which bring to mind things such as the BCCI
case, and so on. Then there is the environment; continuing work on
agricultural trade, and the many of the intricacies there; product stan-
dards; consumer protection in its broader ramifications; and securities
regulation, now moving into a twenty-four-hour market. Around the
world there are securities, market operations, telecommunications,
airline linkages, and so on. And, if you begin to push the frontier, you
also have to think of such things as labor regulations, labor standards,
human rights, and how those link. So, how can we begin to think
about all this? What I want to do is relate this to the World Trade
Organization ("WTO"), and to the broad subject that we are talking
about, and ask whether there are some generalizable principles. The
broad subject, I think, is the subject of the regulation of economic
behavior that crosses borders-international economic regulation.
What I am going to do is present a sort of oversimplified tem-
plate, or type of analysis, that one could walk through to look at this,
basically in two parts. First, I will talk about the policy and economics
of international regulation in the context of some of the traditional,
almost doctrinal, economics learning about regulation relating to gov-
ernment intervention in the market. Second, I will look at the ques-
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tion of institutions, particularly international institutions, and that is
where we move into the questions of some of the very important de-
velopments that are going on right now in the world, and in the WTO
particularly.
I. MARKET-FAILURE ECONOMICS IN AN INTERDEPENDENT WORLD
The first of these subjects is policy and economics of international
economic regulation. The traditional economic learning, the type of
things that you get from undergraduate textbooks, tends to let the
market work and keep the government out. Government ought not to
intervene, it is felt, unless there is some particular reason for
intervening.
Immediately, however, there is a reason for intervening some-
times-the so-called question of market failure: let the market work,
but when the market fails to work, then there is justification for some
kind of intervention. Usually that means government intervention.
And so, the question is: when should governments regulate at all?
Now, notice what I am doing. I am moving in a more general way
toward some of the issues that have been discussed already, because, I
think, there is a tendency to jump immediately to the internationaliza-
tion. What I am doing with this analysis is starting with the broader
question: should you have any government intervention at all? And
it is a question that we have faced consistently in domestic economics
for many decades, perhaps this century. If the answer to that question
is "yes," then we need to ask, "what kind of intervention?"
One of the interesting facets about this is that, in most of the
economic texts, these questions are considered in the context of a do-
mestic economy. There is very little mention about what the indica-
tions of an international economy mean for these conditions. And,
what do they tell us?
Regarding the first question and its relation to market failure, the
most familiar and the most commonly reiterated in the economics
literature are the problems of monopoly (competition policy); the
problems of asymmetry of information (for instance, the consumer
versus the expert sellers), and the problems of government distortions,
for a variety of reasons (and those get very troublesome because there
are a lot of different valid policy reasons why governments step in that
do not have to do with the functioning of the market, and yet they
cause distortions in the market). Also, there is the public goods prob-
lem, the problem of where the market cannot, or cannot adequately,
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give incentive for the creation of something that the public needs, be-
cause there is the opportunity for the whole public to use it, or capture
it (a subject, of course, that is very close to intellectual property ques-
tions). And there is a question which is related to some of the others
that I have just mentioned-the question of distributive justice, or
other alternative policies of governments.
Here is the point where I think our analysis begins to cut. Sup-
pose you can do that analysis in the context of a domestic economy.
Then ask: what difference does it make that we are in the kind of
internationally-linked world that we are in? Look first at monopoly
or competition policy. In some cases, you are really talking about a
world economy; you are not talking about a national economy. And
so, that may change entirely your first judgment as to whether govern-
ment intervention is necessary. For example, perhaps there is a na-
tional monopoly but, over time, borders have been thrown open to the
product in such a way that the national monopoly is really no longer a
market failure, because it has to struggle against the rest of the world.
But you can also see the opposite conclusion possible. It may be that
things do not look like they are market failures domestically, when
you look at a closed economy, or you hypothesize a closed economy.
But when you move to the international system, because of various
formal or informal linkages of various kinds, you may indeed find that
there is market failure. Thus, the international dimension of this cre-
ates the potential for different judgments on the question of whether
we have a particular market failure, monopoly, or competition policy
question.
Asymmetries of information is another case very ripe for difficul-
ties enhanced by the international market. First of all, we have lan-
guage differences worldwide, which makes it much harder for many
persons to be able to understand information. We have deep cultural
differences where a "yes" means "no," a "no" means "maybe," etc.
We have a whole variety of factors: distance, different legal systems,
the ability to enforce contracts in different ways, and so on. So asym-
metries of information can really give rise to a lot of different conclu-
sions, based on international activities.
Government distortions, of course, provide many possibilities.
Are we beginning to face international government distortions? Are
we beginning to face the regulations, for instance, such as General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade's ("GATT") textile system, as an il-




Public goods provide another set of market-failure possibilities.
There are a lot of public goods in the international landscape. One is
peace and security, for instance, peacekeeping in the United Nations.
Another is human rights. There are certain values there, certain
broader values than just economic market-oriented values. Thus,
again the international landscape leads us to a conclusion that the
market is not able to cope the way that we think it ought to be able to.
Distributive justice suggests a variety of policies within the scope
of domestic market concerns: progressive taxation, welfare, safety
nets, and a social market economy. But, internationally, of course, the
developing countries argue for certain preferences. They argue for an
international financial safety net, almost the equivalent of interna-
tional bankruptcy.
So the next question is what the government response to market
failure should be. In the economic literature, there are generally sev-
eral kinds of responses that have been suggested-ways that govern-
ments can intervene. The government can tax. The government can
subsidize. The government can regulate and create penalties for devi-
ant behavior of various kinds. The government can try to alter vari-
ous market incentives, for example, by creating a system of permits
that are purchased or bid for, to allow certain environmental degrada-
tion under certain systems.
What about the international system, then? Now, here is where
we begin to see major problems, because the international system is
relatively frail and undeveloped and it makes it very hard to take on
this whole inventory of responses. It is very hard, or impossible, for
the international system to tax, at least under current situations. It is
quite hard for the international system to subsidize, because national
sovereign governments are not prepared to give enough sums of
money to an international body that would be doing the subsidizing,
to make it really worthwhile. The focus internationally is really on
regulation, partly, by second- or third-best-analyses in many cases, be-
cause the international system cannot tax very well, or subsidize. The
fourth alternative I mentioned, incidentally-altering the market in-
centives of certain structures-is also difficult for the international
system, e.g., to set up an apparatus for selling licenses or auctioning
licenses. So, the focus is really on regulation, and in many cases, that
seems to be the only available international government intervention.
In this two-part analysis, we look first at where there is a need for
intervention and we see how the international system, market, and so
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on, conditions that. Second, we examine the responses. It is not nec-
essarily the case that, because the international landscape causes a dif-
ferent judgment on market failure, there needs to be an international
response. It may be that the international landscape, which causes us
to make a judgment of market failure and therefore a need for gov-
ernment intervention, could nevertheless lead us to decide that the
kind of government intervention ought to be a national government
intervention, and not necessarily an international one. So, that is part
of the analysis also.
And, indeed, then you get into a cost-benefit analysis of choosing
institutions to respond. You then have to ask whether it should be
international, or whether it should be domestic, or what levels of gov-
ernment are the best for intervention: from the local neighborhood all
the way up to global government entities.
In a number of cases, the optimum approach would be some kind
of international or global response, but the institution concerned is so
weak, or so fraught with the potential abuse that, on a cost-benefit
analysis, you decide that you really cannot choose that. You have to
fall back on national governments for intervention because of the dan-
gers, or risks, of the international system. Sometimes, because the in-
ternational system is too rigid-that it is so hard to renegotiate a
treaty, for example-that once a measure is in place, it is virtually
impossible to amend. We have seen elements of that in the GATT,
and maybe now in the WTO. So when we look at the international
intervention, let me just remind you that there are a series of different
possibilities there. There are also unilateral possibilities in the nation/
state acting through extraterritorial measures, or section 301-type
measures, of threatened sanctions or threatened retaliation.
II. INSTITUTIONS
Now, let us turn to institutions, particularly international institu-
tions. The first thing we have to ask is: What are some of the goals of
the international institutions, or what are some of the goals of having
international institutions intervene in markets?
Of course, the prime goal is to facilitate the cooperative mecha-
nisms of many nations. This actually can take you into another kind
of economic analysis, sometimes called the prisoner's dilemma, where
you look at what governments might do independently, or unilater-
ally, and you discover that if they all act unilaterally in their own par-
ticular interest, the effect is a disaster multilaterally, or a disaster for
19961
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the world. One country can use tariff increases, for instance, in cer-
tain strategic ways to try to gain additional welfare for its population,
until other countries start to do the same thing, possibly in retaliation,
and then, very soon, you have a spiraling down of the welfare avail-
able in the world, even putting aside the question of distribution. The
international institution really has to be first and foremost designed to
facilitate the cooperative mechanisms that are called for in many
cases.
I suggest as another goal that institutions act in a way that allows
implementation of goals, which usually means a rule-oriented system
because the rule-oriented system allows adequate predictability and
becomes a basis of planning for non-governmental organizations
("NGOs"), corporations, private entrepreneurs, and so forth.
By that we mean a system that operates on rules which are nego-
tiated and formulated through some kind of a rule-making process,
but once in place, there is a structure to make those rules reasonably
effective so that individual entrepreneurs can depend on it and use
them for predictability and planning. A reason for this is our desire to
have markets work. In other words, this is really tuned to market-
oriented economies where you have decentralized decision-making.
Millions of entrepreneurs, not the central state agency, are making
decisions, and those millions of entrepreneurs need some kind of
framework for planning.
For example, if an entrepreneur plans to invest in a shoe plant in
Costa Rica, it needs to know several things. It needs to know that its
property is reasonably protected. It needs to know something about
the intellectual property being protected. It needs to know something
about whether that plant will be able sell across borders, because
Costa Rica is arguably too small to support an efficient shoe factory.
If it does not know these things, then it faces higher risks, and that
means it needs a higher return, which in turn means that the lack of a
rule orientation raises the "risk premium" of the allocation of capital
in the world, and therefore reduces the welfare in the world.
How do you make the rules? Well, you need some kind of an
institutional structure that will do that, because you need, first of all,
to formulate the initial set of cooperative mechanisms. However, then
you need somehow to make it keep up, and that is often the most
difficult part of this international system. That is true in a lot of differ-
ent areas, including arms control, the United Nations Charter, and the
worry about the Security Council and its makeup. It is very hard to
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change treaties, particularly when you have 130 to 180 countries in-
volved with all sorts of constitutional processes. This you do not do
lightly, and so the institutions have to be put in place with some of
that in mind, and that leads to some subparts of this analysis under
rule-making.
You have to figure out how decisions are going to be made. Will
you have weighted voting? Will you have a Security Council, a small
council-type system, or is it "one-nation, one-vote"? If so, what are
the ramifications of that for large, powerful countries in the system,
who, de facto, and empirically, are not going to submit to very impor-
tant decisions on a "one-nation, one-vote" system. You also need the
capability at various levels, but probably internationally, to study,
gather information, research, analyze, and flag some of the issues
coming down the track, so that the system will not be so surprised, as
it was, for instance, in the Mexico Peso problem. And, you need legit-
imation. You need something that seems to be fair in the minds of the
world's citizenship, if you will, the world's citizenry.
So that leads to a fourth goal-the goal of oversight and audit, as
the way I have phrased this at the moment. You want to keep the
institution responsive, moving with the times, but you want to keep it
honest. Furthermore, you do not want it to be defrauded all the time,
and you do not want special interests taking over portions of the deci-
sion-making apparatus. Finally, you want it to be viewed as legiti-
mate, that is, you want, again, the citizens throughout the world to say
"yes, they are doing the best they can in looking out for our interests,
we know that human institutions are never perfect, but on balance, we
need to have that." So what do you do for that?
One response is transparency. This has been an enormous weak-
ness of international organizations and structures, partly from several
centuries' history of diplomatic discourse, which has strongly stressed
negotiation in a context of secrecy, and, in some cases, secrecy in or-
der to prevent their home constituencies from learning what they are
doing. That is not all bad because sometimes what they are doing
requires certain compromises, and they do not want to telegraph those
compromises too early in a process where there may be some educa-
tion needed of the citizenry. If there is anything that the environmen-
talists have taught us in the last five years about international
regulation, it is this issue of transparency. It is something, of course,
we are struggling with in the context of the WTO.
1996]
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Participation is important also. This again goes back to the ques-
tion of international rule-making by elites. We have just begun to de-
velop a worldwide system in some of our institutions where there is
much broader public participation, quite often through the formula of
NGOs, and certification of NGOs in a variety of contexts. That is
something that the new WTO is struggling with right now.
Checks on power, or checks and balances, are necessary to keep
the international system from misusing its power. Now, there are a
number of interstitial ways that we do that, and some of those have
been mentioned yesterday. One of them is limits on decision-making,
where we limit the powers of the governing body. There is a lot of this
in the WTO charter, and this was a matter of great concern to the U.S.
Congress last year, for instance. My own perception and testimony
was that the WTO Charter actually had better limits on decision-mak-
ing, in the sense of checks and balances, than GATT. This raises a
counter-problem: are there too many limits on the decision-making
and rule-making in the institution? For example, are there too many
limits on decisions that relate to voting structure and so forth? The
nonself-executing nature of the international decisions and the inter-
national treaties are a form of check and balance against overreaching
power.
There are limits in the dispute-settlement process also. How far
can a panel go, what is its competence, and what should a tribunal do?
There have been some specific areas that have been raised in the last
few years about this, and we can recognize those as part of a pattern
of checks and balances, even if we do not agree in all cases about
them. For instance, what should be the standard of review by a panel
which is examining a national government executive branch action?
Can it review national actions de novo, or should it only look at the
law and not the facts? If it looks at the law, is it only the international
law, namely the treaty clauses, at which it looks? What are the
grounds of interpreting the treaty clauses?
Of course, we have a very interesting clause in the antidumping
text, Article 17.6, that in the closing minutes of the Uruguay Round
proved to be a possible deal-breaker. The whole round could have
collapsed on the basis of this arcane language that I do not think more
than about three dozen people in the world understood.
Another example is the legal effect of the result of a panel, or
tribunal ruling. Generally, under international law, it is not stare deci-
sis. There is some precedential effect, but it is not stare decisis. That
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is the approach of the World Court statute, and it is a pattern reaf-
firmed by some of the preeminent authors of international law.
Again, in a sense, that is a form of check, because it is saying: "All
right, panelists, you can solve this particular dispute between countries
A and B, but you're not going to proclaim a rule that's going to bind
the other 138 members of this organization, in all future cases."
Then there is something that distresses some people, what I
would call "national oversight and audit" of what the international
system is doing. In the United States, we have a lot of it, maybe, some
would say, too much of it. We have the Congress holding hearings
about the United Nations, refusing to pay its budgetary fees, etc. In
the WTO context, we have, on the horizon, something called the
"Dole Commission." It is still not legislation, but it tracks a compro-
mise that Senator Dole had with the administration late in 1994, which
was absolutely crucial to get approval of the Uruguay Round. The
idea calls for a national commission that is supposed to review and
advise the Congress on the legitimacy of what a panel does in a deci-
sion that relates to the United States. Is this bad? There are certain
elements that are pretty benign, although there are one or two ele-
ments that are kind of borderline, but I think we could live with them
without much trouble.
National constitutions and how they work are necessary to inter-
face the international system with the domestic system. This is a
potential check. The question of selecting the officers of the interna-
tional system will be a check on power. Are there self-perpetuating
officers in the system that seem to be able to prolong their tenures,
even though there is considerable doubt about their effectiveness as
leaders of some of these international organizations? Indeed, this re-
lates even to some allegations of fraudulent behavior.
And then there is this pregnant word that was mentioned once or
twice yesterday-"subsidiarity." And, that again, relates to the ques-
tion of how far up or down the scale of governmental entities should
decision-making of government intervention be placed, which is partly
a checks-and-balances question, but partly an allocation-of-power
question, which are two questions very closely related.
III. WTO
How does the WTO stack up against this? Is the WTO going to
be the institution that many of us hope it will be, and will it be an
improvement on this very messy, but joyously interesting institution,
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the GATT of the past? Does it improve on the GATT? I am con-
vinced it does. I think the WTO has many attributes that are far supe-
rior to the GATT, along the lines that I have mentioned. The rule-
making is much better constrained and checked, for what that is
worth. The new WTO dispute-settlement understanding applies a
very elaborate set of texts for a dispute-settlement procedure that we
all hope is going to work well and improve the system.
The WTO faced an enormous challenge by the United States in
May and June in the disastrous Japan/United States auto situation,
where I think the United States very shortsightedly thumbed its nose
at the system. In the end, however, it appears that the United States
backed down, so in doing that, it may have actually strengthened the
system.
As indicated above, however, the other side for many of these
questions is whether we have gone too far with the checks. Let me
just give you several examples. First, in order to amend the dispute-
settlement understanding, it takes full consensus. Now, consensus is a
delicate word in GAIT history and in the new WTO. It is. not quite
unanimity, but in certain situations, I think it can amount to unanim-
ity, and it can cause a stalemate or the prevention of any progress in
evolving the Dispute Settlement Understanding rules. We have to
watch and see if we can make the system work nevertheless, using
certain custom and practice to try to interpret some of the existing
language in a way, for example, to provide for more opportunity for
transparency and public citizen understanding.
Another example is whether there will be more opportunity for
NGO participation in a way that will enhance the legitimacy of the
process. Another example is Annex 4 of the WTO, which contains
four international text agreements that are Pluralateral Agreements,
which means optional. This is a slight departure from the single-pack-
age approach of the Uruguay Round negotiation. This could be a
place where you could really make some progress for new upcoming
issues. That could be a place, for instance, for competition-policy text,
or an environment-policy text. But additions to Annex 4 require full
consensus, and thus, can be blocked. We will have to see what the
practice will be. That might be an area of dynamicism in which the
organization can begin to face many of these new issues, some of them
left over from the Uruguay Round and some of them to be faced in
the future. On the other hand, it may be a place that will result in
more stalemate.
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